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1. Introduction
Our topic in this paper is the proper analysis of sentences such as (1a-c).
(1) a. The average American has 2.3 children.
b. The average Freddie Voter belongs to 3.2 airline programs.
(www.freddieawards.com/events/17/trivial.htm)
c. Although we did not measure this in our study, I can say from other
work the average German sees his doctor 13 times a year, the average
Swiss sees his doctor 7.5 times a year, and the average Briton 3.5 times.
(British National Corpus)
The mystery of (1a-b) is that it seems that they can be true, even though there is no
person in the world that is the reference of the noun phrases the average American
and the average Freddie Voter, and no person in the world that has 2.3 children. (1c)
makes a similar point, though in a somewhat different fashion: while the property
of seeing one’s doctor 7.5 times per year is not incoherent in the same way as the
property of having 2.3 children, the truth of (1c) does not commit us to the existence
of any individuals who actually have this property.
Both linguists and philosophers have used average sentences to draw dra-
matic conclusions of various sorts. For example, Norbert Hornstein and Noam
Chomsky have used this class of sentences to argue that semantic theory does not
exploit a reference relation, a relation between words and things (Hornstein 1984,
Chomsky 2000). Similarly, some philosophers have used these sentences to argue
that singular reference is not ontologically committing. Such conclusions are far
too hasty. Those who based dramatic conclusions about the nature of semantics or
ontological commitment on average sentences are unfairly exploiting the lack of a
compositional semantics for sentences of this sort. In this paper, we provide the ﬁrst
such semantics. Moreover, we show that within the referential approach to seman-
tics one can provide a detailed compositional semantics of these constructions that
reveals much of speciﬁc linguistic interest. Speciﬁcally, average sentences provide
new evidence that the compositional system of natural language must allow for the
possibility that the nuclear scope of of a scope-taking term may serve as the argu-
ment of a third expression, rather than the scope-taking term itself, a relation that
Barker (2007) refers to as PARASITIC SCOPE.
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T. Friedman and S. Ito (eds.), SALT XVIII, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. Before proceeding, we want to distinguish the use of average in (1), which
is the focus of this paper, from the use in examples like (2).
(2) a. Cruise lines have also decided to target a more average american.
(www.cruisemates.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=540988)
b. ThemostaverageAmericanisBob Burns, a53-year-oldbuildingmain-
tenance supervisor in Windham, Conn.
(www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/13/eveningnews/main1124183.shtml)
c. As an outsider Bush looks like a perfectly average American to me. He
loves nascar and knows no history or geography...
(www.lioncity.net/buddhism/loﬁversion/index.php/t25936.html)
In these examples, average is a gradable predicate (as shown by the acceptability
of degree modiﬁcation) with a meaning roughly equivalent to typical, which can
replace it without a signiﬁcant shift in meaning. In contrast, the sense of average
we are interested is not gradable and is not synonymous with typical: substituting
typical for average in (1a), for example, results in a sentence that is anomalous
precisely because it does entail the existence of Americans with 2.3 children. See
Kennedy and Stanley (2008) for an extended argument that these two uses of aver-
age are semantically distinct.
2. Previous analyses
We have a number of distinct complaints about each previous approach to the prob-
lem of average sentences, but due to space considerations, we leave the task of
a rigorous account of the shortcomings of previous accounts to other work (see
Kennedy and Stanley 2008). Here we focus here on two common failings. First,
all previous theories fail to be compositional. Second, all previous theories fail to
account for all of the different contexts in which average can occur.
According to Carlson and Pelletier (2002), an expression of the form the
average American denotes a set of properties. The set of properties it denotes is
determined by subjecting the denotation of its nominal argument to what they call
a partition function part and a special kind of averaging function ave, as spelled out
in (3) (where fc is a contextually restricted variant of f, the property contributed by
the noun; see Carlson and Pelletier (2002), p. 92) :
(3) [[average]]c =   f.{Q | Q   ave(part(fc))}
The job of the partition function is to take a common noun denotation and yield
an object over which the averaging function can operate. As Carlson and Pelletier
(p. 91) write, part “...has the dual jobs of (a) ﬁnding the appropriate partitions of
the properties indicated by the CN it is operating on, and (b) for each partition
thus constructed, building the set of ordered pairs made up of individual CNs and
value-on-that-partition. For example, if we are computing a semantic value for the
average American, then part(american 
c) will ﬁrst determine what the appropriate
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‘weight’, ‘number of children’, ‘food preferences’, etc., for all those types of prop-
erties we are used to seeing in reports of the features of average Americans.”
Furthermore, according to Carlson and Pelletier, for each dimension that
is relevant for paritioning the set corresponding to the Common Noun denotation,
the part function produces a set of ordered pairs  x,v  where x is an individual
in the partition, and v is that individual’s “most speciﬁc value” along the relevant
dimension. So, if Kim has 2 children, then part(american 
c) will include only
 Kim,2  along the “number of children” partition, and no other Kim-containing
ordered pairs in that partition.
The job of the averaging function ave is then to range over all of these sets
of pairs and “do some computation ... to ﬁgure out the average value corresponding
to each partition” (p. 92). Let’s assume for the moment that this is simply a matter
of summing up the values of the second members of each pair and dividing by the
cardinality of the partition set. Assuming that the is semantically vacuous in such
constructions, the average American would end up denoting a set of properties, as
shown in (4).
(4) [[average]]([[American]]) = ave(part(american 
c)) =
{ x.x has 2.3 children,  x.x weighs 150.25 lbs,  x.x is 64 in tall,  x.x is
concerned about the economy,  x.x eats too much fast food, ...}
Thus, on Carlson and Pelletier’s analysis, the average American ends up denoting
a set of properties, the same semantic type as generalized quantiﬁers.
However, trouble looms when one reﬂects on how the set of properties is
supposed to be generated from partitions, which are sets of person-number pairs.
How do we get from the set of ordered pairs  Kim,2 ,  Hannah,8 ,  Bill,3 , etc. to
the property of having 2.3 children? Pairs like  Kim,2  and  Hannah,8  might be
relevant for determining properties like having 2.3 children, but they also might be
relevant for determining properties like having 2.3 cars. There is no compositional
way to go from a set of person-number pairs to a property. There are various repairs
one can imagine to respond to this problem, and in other work we discuss them in
detail (Kennedy and Stanley 2008). The end result of our discussion is that there is
no compositional repair for this problem, short of adopting something very close to
our own semantics.
The second problem for Carlson and Pelletier’s theory is that it does not
respect the generality of the phenomenon. The abstract interpretation of average
appears in several construction types in addition to the adjectival form. Two addi-
tional (and more colloquial) forms of abstract average are illustrated in (5):
(5) NYU has reported that the 53 teens have lost an average of half of their
excess weight over the past year, and that’s truly excellent, considering that
[their average weight was 297 pounds] at the beginning!
The examples in (6a-e) illustrate the different ways of expressing the content of
the bracketed part of (5) (other word orders are also possible). That these are all
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can be felicitously modiﬁed by exactly and by the fact that each of these examples
could be true even if no individual student among the group of 53 weighed 297 lbs
(6) a. The average weight of the teens in the study was 297 lbs.
b. The teens in the study averaged 297 lbs in weight.
c. The teens in the study weighed an average of 297 lbs.
d. The teens in the study weighed on average 297 lbs.
e. The average teen in the study weighed 297 lbs.
However, Carlson and Pelletier’s theory is a theory only of the use in (6e). Thus
even if it were compositional, it would not be sufﬁciently general. It tells us nothing
about the relation between this use and e.g. the use of average as a verb, as in (6b).
Higginbotham’s (1985) classic discussion of average DPs gets around this
problem to some extent by suggesting that prenominal average can function as an
adverb as well as an adjective, where the former corresponds to its abstract inter-
pretation and the latter to its concrete one. On this view, (1a) should be understand
as equivalent to (7):
(7) Americans, on average, have 2.3 children.
Since (7) does not contain a deﬁnite description that has to be analyzed as making
reference to odd entities, an analysis of (1a) in terms of this structure would bypass
Chomsky’s metaphysical worries.
But Higginbotham’s suggestion does not in fact provide us with a composi-
tional semantics for average sentences, and as a result, does not provide us with a
response to the worries such constructions pose for referential semantics. The prob-
lem becomes clear when we take a closer look at the verb phrase in this example,
have 2.3 children. If we assume that numbers are of the category D and combine
with NPs to form generalized quantiﬁers (Barwise and Cooper 1981, Keenan and
Stavi 1986), then 2.3 denotes the relation between sets in (8).
(8) [[[D 2.3]]] =  P Q. | P Q |= 2.3
This meaning will give us the generalized quantiﬁer denotation in (9a) for the DP
2.3 children (assuming for simplicity that NPs denote sets), which will in turn give
us the property in (9b) as the denotation for the VP have 2.3 children:
(9) a. [[[DP 2.3 children]]] =  Q. | children  Q |= 2.3
b. [[[VPhave 2.3 children]]] =  x. | children  {y | have (y)(x)}| = 2.3
According to (9b), have 2.3 children is true of an object x if and only if
the cardinality of the intersection of the set of children and the set of things that x
has equals 2.3. If this property is a constituent of the logical form of (7), then any
way of spelling out the meaning of on average that involves predicating the VP of
actual individuals is going to entail a commitment to the existence of individuals
with fractional children. This is clearly the wrong result, since (7) does not carry
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not help. Such a move would have consequences for the denotation of the second
(Q) argument of 2.3, but it would not eliminate the fractional child entailment. The
relationalsemanticsforthenumeralin(8)requiresthecardinalityoftheintersection
of Q, no matter what set it deﬁnes, and the set of children to equal 2.3, which will
be the case only if there are some fractional children.
In short, merely assuming that pronominal average can be interpreted ad-
verbially does not eliminate our problem; we also need to say what the semantic
contribution of have 2.3 children is, and why this surface constituent doesn’t end
up introducing a property such as (9b). So Higginbotham’s proposal does not in
fact amount to a compositional semantics for average sentences.
3. Our analysis
3.1. Overview
Consider again the range of contexts in which average occurs, illustrated in (6).
The generalization that can be drawn from these examples is that, independent of its
grammatical category and syntactic position, abstract average requires three seman-
tic arguments: a measure function (here based on the meaning of weight/weighed),
a domain (provided by the DP the teens in the study), and an average, the result
of dividing the sum of the values derived by applying the measure function to
each object in the domain by the set’s cardinality (297 lbs.). In other words, all
of the examples in (6) convey the information in (10) (possibly along with other,
construction-speciﬁc aspects of meaning that we abstract away from here), where
weight is a function from objects to their weights, T is the set of teens in this par-
ticular study, and 297lbs is a degree of weight.
(10)  x Tweight(x)
|T|
= 297lbs
In prose: the sum of the weights we get by applying the weight function to all of
the objects in T, divided by the number of elements in T is 297lbs.
Our challenge is to show that we can get from each of the different syntactic
forms in (6) to truth conditions equivalent to (10) — and in particular, that we can
get from (6d) and (6e) to (10) — without doing violence to generally accepted as-
sumptions about the nature of semantic composition. Our strategy will be to assume
thatoneoftheformsin(6)isbasic, provideitwithadenotationthatderivesthetruth
conditions in (10), and show how this basic denotation, together independently jus-
tiﬁed assumptions about possible Logical Forms and compositional operations on
them, can be used to derive appropriate truth conditions for all forms of average.
Before proceeding, we want to make explicit two assumptions that we will
adopt in order to maximize the clarity of the following exposition. The ﬁrst is a
simplifying assumption: we will treat the domain argument of average in all cases
WHAT AN AVERAGE SEMANTICS NEEDS 469as a set, ignoring the fact that the linguistic expression that provides this argument
may take different forms (a bare plural, a deﬁnite plural, a conjunction structure, a
bare noun, etc.) and also ignoring the potentially important contribution of verbal
particles like each, per year and so forth. It is quite likely that a proper analysis will
need to assume that the different forms of average actually include mappings from
different kinds of expressions to sets (or possibly to more structured objects, such
as pluralities), but since it is straightforward to deﬁne such mappings and since our
more general proposals are consistent with different analytical options here, we will
talk in terms of sets in what follows.
Second, although we assume that one of the crucial semantic components
of averaging is a measure function (type  e,d ), as described above, in all of the
constructions we examine the actual linguistic terms that provide this component
denote degree relations, either type  e,dt  (such as the noun weight) or type  d,et 
(such as the verb weigh):
(11) a. [[weightN]] =  x d.weight(x)=d
b. [[weighV]] =  d x.weight(x)=d
Degree relations (either lexical or derived) can easily be converted into measure
functions, however, so we will use the following abbreviatory conventions in our
semantic representations to simplify the notation:
(12) a. If f   D e,dt , then fmeas =  x.max{d | f(x)(d)}
b. If f   D d,et , then fmeas =  x.max{d | f(d)(x)}
Seee.g., Cresswell(1977),Heim(1985),Klein(1991),Carpenter(1997)andKennedy
(to appear) for the use of such conversions in the semantic analysis of comparatives.
3.2. Basic cases
We begin with the assumption that the form of average in (6a), which combines
directly with a measure noun, reﬂects the basic meaning of the term. This assump-
tion, while arbitrary, is based on an informal search of the British National Corpus
for collocations of the average, an average and on average, which suggests that the
measure noun-modifying form in (6a) is by far the most frequent. Nothing hinges
on this particular assumption, however, and our analysis is completely consistent
with another (or a more abstract, category-neutral) form being basic.
The structure of a noun phrase containing this form of average is as shown
in (13) for the average weight of the teens.
(13)
the
average weight of the teens
Assuming that the noun weight denotes the degree relation in (11a) and that the
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throughout as teens ), this structure indicates that the core meaning of average is
the function average in (14) (where fmeas is the measure function based on f, as
deﬁned in (12)).
(14) average =   f S d. x Sfmeas(x)
|S|
= d
Composition of the nominal portion of (13) gives us (15a), which spells out as the
property of degrees in (15b) after lexical insertion and  -conversion.
(15) a. average([[weight]])([[the teens]])
b.  d
 
 x teens weight(x)
|teens |
= d
 
This property is true of a degree if it equals the average weight of the teens, and
further composition with the deﬁnite article will result in a deﬁnite description that
picks out the unique degree that satisﬁes this property. The net result is that (6a) is
predicted to be true just in case the average weight of the teens equals the degree
denoted by 297 lbs., which is exactly what we want.
The verbal form of average in (6b) can be analyzed in much the same terms,
the only difference being the order of argument composition. Taking the surface
syntax as a guide, the verbal form differs from the basic form in selecting the degree
argument ﬁrst, then the measure argument (which can also be implicit if the context
is rich enough, as in as in The teens averaged 297 lbs.), and ﬁnally the domain
argument, as shown in (16).
(16)
the teens
averaged 297 lbs
in weight
An appropriate meaning for the verb can then be deﬁned in terms of average:
(17) [[[V average]]] =  d  f S.average(f)(S)(d)
Composition of the various constituents in (16) gives (18a), which maps onto (18b)
after lexical insertion and  -conversion, which is in turn equivalent to (18c).
(18) a. [[averageV]]([[297 lbs]])([[weight]])([[the teens]])
b. average([[weight]])([[the teens]])([[297 lbs]])
c.  x teens weight(x)
|teens |
= 297lbs
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We now turn to the nominal form of average in (6c), which can be analyzed se-
mantically in exactly the same way as verbal average, even though its syntactic
properties are different. Assuming the structure of (6c) is as shown in (19), the
denotation we want is the one in (20).
(19)
the teens
weighed
an
average of 297 lbs
(20) [[[N average]]] =  d  f S.average(f)(S)(d)
Compositionisthenstraightforward: averagecombinesﬁrstwiththemeasurephrase
297 lbs, then with the measure verb weigh, and ﬁnally with the subject, resulting in
(21a). (We assume for simplicity here that an and of are semantically vacuous.)
(21) a. [[averageN]]([[297 lbs]])([[weigh]])([[the teens]])
b. average([[weigh]])([[the teens]])([[297 lbs]])
c.  y teens weight(y)
|teens |
= 297lbs
Given the denotation in (20), (21a) is equivalent to (21b), which spells out as (21c)
after lexical insertion and  -conversion. (6c) is thus correctly predicted to be truth-
conditionally equivalent to (6a) and (6b).
In examples like (6c), the degree relation that average converts into a mea-
sure function is lexical, provided directly by the verb weigh. However, in many
other constructions involving an average of, the degree relation is not lexical but
instead must be derived in the syntax. (22) is an example of such a construction.
(22) The teens ate an average of 17.5 hamburgers each.
The degree relation we want in order to get the right truth conditions for this exam-
ple is the relation between quantities n and individuals x that is true just in case the
number of hamburgers that x ate equals n, which we represent informally in (23).
(23)  n x.x ate n hamburgers
If(23)issuppliedasthesecondargumentofnominalaverage, andthepluralsubject
as the third argument, the truth conditions we will ultimately end up with are those
represented in (24).
(24)  y teens  x.max{n | x ate n hamburgers}(y)
|teens |
= 17.5
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how we get from the verb phrase eat an average of 17.5 hamburgers to the degree
relation in (23). In fact, this is exactly the question that we kept running up against
in our discussion of previous approaches to the average NP in section 2. Recall
from that discussion that the problem we confronted was how to avoid interpreting
a verb phrase like have 2.3 children in a way that didn’t entail of any entity that it
has 2.3 children, an entailment made by any approach that assumes that numerals
are quantiﬁcational determiners that combine with nominals to yield generalized
quantiﬁers. In order to derive a degree relation like (23), and avoid these problems,
we need to give up this assumption. Instead, we need to recognize that number
terms lead a dual life. In addition to their use as quantiﬁcational determiners and
corresponding relational meanings, they also occur as singular terms. As such,
they can saturate a degree/quantity position inside the noun phrase, and take scope
independently of the rest of the noun phrase in which they occur. (See Kennedy and
Stanley (2008) for discussion and defense.)
The hypothesis that numbers saturate an amount/degree argument even in
constructions in which they superﬁcially appear to be determiners is developed in
great detail by Manfred Krifka (1989, 1992) and used to account for a range of facts
involving aspectual composition and the relation between nominal and verbal ref-
erence. (See also Cresswell (1977), and for a different implementation of the same
idea, see Hackl (2001).) What is important for our purposes is Krifka’s analysis of
plural count nouns as two place relations between numbers (or degrees/amounts —
we do not draw a distinction between these things here) and plural individuals. The
plural noun hamburgers, on this view, has the denotation in (25) (where the variable
x ranges over plural rather than atomic individuals; see Link (1983)).
(25) [[hamburgers]] =  n x.hamburgers (x) | x |= n
Composition with a number returns a property that is true of pluralities of hamburg-
ers whose cardinality is equal to that number. The denotation of three hamburgers,
for example, is (26).
(26)  x.hamburgers (x) | x |= 3
This property may then compose with a verb meaning, saturating an open argu-
ment, and the variable corresponding to this argument will ultimately be bound by
a default existential quantiﬁer, deriving truth conditions that are equivalent to what
we get on a standard generalized quantiﬁer semantics.
What is important for our purposes is that on this analysis, a number or other
amount term saturates the degree argument of a plural noun, and so can in principle
take scope independently of the rest of the noun phrase, leaving a degree variable
in its place. This provides us with a straightforward means of deriving the degree
relation in (23) and providing a compositional analysis of (22). The analysis runs
as follows.
First, we assume that an average of 17.5 is a constituent in this example
that occupies the same syntactic position as a simple number. As such, it may take
WHAT AN AVERAGE SEMANTICS NEEDS 473scope independently of the rest of the noun phrase. A Logical Form that returns the
desired truth conditions can be derived by raising an average of 17 to adjoin to VP:
(27)
the teens
an average of 17.5
 n
ate
n hamburgers
Assuming existential closure over the variable introduced by the object, the deno-
tation of the sister of an average of 17.5 is (28), which is a more precise character-
ization of the degree relation that we posited earlier in (23).
(28)  n x. y[ate (y)(x) hamburgers (y) | y |= n]
Composition may then proceed as described above, deriving the truth conditions
in (24). In effect, the LF we are positing for (22) is a variant of the synonymous
sentence in (29), which uses verbal average.
(29) The teens each averaged 17.5 in number of hamburgers eaten.
Before moving to the next section, we should say a few words about our
assumption that an average of 17 — and by extension, numbers in general — can
undergo quantiﬁer raising. While our assumptions about semantic type certainly
allow for this option, one might object that the syntax of English does not allow for
such structures, pointing to the impossibility of overt extraction of number terms in
examples like (30a-b).
(30) a. *How many did they eat t hamburgers?
b. *It was 17 that they ate t hamburgers.
However, there are other kinds of examples which suggest that English syntax does
allow for such structures. One case involves quantity comparisons like (31a), where
it is generally assumed that the comparative clause has the structure in (31b) (see
e.g., Bresnan 1973, Chomsky 1977, Heim 1985, Hackl 2001, Kennedy 2002).
(31) a. Miller has hit more big shots in playoff games than O’Neal has hit
free throws. (Chicago Tribune, June 3, 2000)
b. [wh O’Neal has hit [t free throws]]
Another piece of evidence that the syntax-semantics interface allows an
amount term to scope independently of the rest of the DP comes from so-called
“reconstruction effects” in how many questions (Heycock 1995) like (32), which
has the two interpretations paraphrased in (32a) and (32b).
(32) How many people did Jones decide to hire?
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b. What is the number such that Jones decided to hire that many people?
Different syntactic and semantic mechanisms have been proposed to derive this
ambiguity (see Fox (1999) for discussion of alternatives); what is crucial for us
is that the reading in (32b) involves scoping only the amount quantiﬁer above the
intensional verb decide and interpreting the rest of the nominal in its base position
in the embedded clause, which is exactly what we are suggesting for numerals.
3.4. Parasitic scope
We are now ready to tackle the ﬁnal two average sentences: the adjectival and
adverbial forms shown in (33a-b).
(33) a. The average American has 2.3 children.
b. Americans have 2.3 children on average.
Recall from our discussion in section 2 that a central failing of previous analyses
is that they fail to provide a compositional semantics that explains why the verb
phrases in these examples do not denote the property of having 2.3 children. Our
discussion in the previous section provides an answer to this question: since num-
bers may take scope independently of the noun phrases in which they occur, these
examples can be mapped onto LFs in which the number has been raised out of the
VP, leaving behind a constituent of the form have n children. We have already seen
that this type of constituent can end up supplying the content of a measure function
mapping individuals to the number of children they have, which both avoids the
problematic entailments created by leaving the number in place, and moreover is
exactly what we will need to compute the desired truth conditions for (33a-b).
There is a complication, however, which we illustrate with a discussion of
(33a). (The same considerations apply to (33b).) If the number takes scope, then
either of (34a-b) are possible LFs for this example.
(34) a.
the average American
2.3
 n
has
n children
b.
2.3
 n
the average American
has
n children
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adjectival average based on the underlying function average (both of which assume
that the nominal provides the domain argument, as reﬂected by surface syntax).
(35) a. [[[A average ]]] =  S  f d.average(f)(S)(d)
b. [[[A average ]]] =  S d  f.average(f)(S)(d)
The problem is that these denotations presume that the average term and the
degree relation are provided by distinct syntactic constituents. However, given the
standard syntactic deﬁnition of QR, the term that corresponds to the former (the
raised number) and the term that corresponds to the later (the constituent marked
by  n in (34a-b)) form a syntactic constituent exclusive of the average American.
Compositionality therefore dictates that these two elements also form a semantic
constituent, and indeed, this is the normal result of QR. The Logical Forms for
(33b) will be identical in the relevant respects, as the number will end up scoping
either below the adverb, as in (34a), or above it, as in (34b). What we need is
some principle that allows us to “split apart” the average and the degree relation
and provide each as separate arguments to the average American or on average.
Fortunately for us, it turns out that exactly such a mechanism has been in-
dependently invoked in order to account for the interpretation of comparative con-
structions (Heim 1985, Bhatt and Takahashi 2007, Kennedy to appear), distributive
interpretations of plural DPs (Sauerland 1998), and noun-modifying uses of same
and different (Barker 2007). Speciﬁcally, we need to allow for the possibility that a
third constituent can intervene between a scope-taking constituent and the function-
denoting constituent that normally serves as its scope, a conﬁguration that Barker
(2007) dubs “parasitic scope”.
Comparatives like (36) provide a good illustration of parasitic scope.
(36) More people live in New York than Chicago.
Most work on comparatives assumes that more and the than-phrase form a con-
stituent in Logical Form. There is also a substantial amount of syntactic evidence
that the “standard” constituent in an example like (36) (the complement of than)
can be a simple noun phrase, rather than an underlyingly clausal structure (Han-
kamer 1973). Such a structure requires the denotation for more in (37), which is
looking for two individual arguments — a standard of comparison y and a “target”
of comparison x — and a degree relation (Heim 1985, Hoeksema 1984, Bhatt and
Takahashi 2007, Kennedy 1999, to appear).
(37) [[more]] =  y  f d,et  x.fmeas(x)   fmeas(y)
The degree relation is converted into a measure function and applied to the target
and standard, so that the truth conditions of a comparative are ultimately stated in
terms of an asymmetric ordering between two degrees.
In (36), the standard argument is directly provided by Chicago (than is typi-
cally assumed to be vacuous). In order to derive the right truth conditions, the target
argument should be New York, and the degree relation should be the one in (38).
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We can derive such a relation by raising both more than Chicago, which saturates
the degree argument of the plural DP (the same slot occupied by a number), and
New York. But in order to derive a Logical Form that is interpretable in just the
right way, we crucially need to close off the scope of the latter below the former, as
shown in (39).
(39)
New York
more than Chicago  n
 x
n people live in x
In other words, we need a representation in which the comparative constituent is
“parasitic” on the scope term created by QR of the DP New York. The resulting LF
is fully interpretable, and gives us exactly the truth conditions we want, as shown
in the following derivation:
(40) a. [[more]]([[Chicago]])([[ n x.n people live in x]])([[NY]])
b.  x.max{n | n people live in x}(NY )  
 x.max{n | n people live in x}(Chicago )
Returning now to the average American, the Logical Form we need in order
to derive the correct truth conditions for (33a) is one that is parallel in the relevant
respectsto(39). Speciﬁcally, weneedarepresentationinwhichthenumberisraised
to a position just above the average American, while the variable it leaves behind is
bound off just below this DP. In other words, we need the average American to be
parasitic on the scope of the number, as shown in (41).
(41)
2.3
th’average American  n
has
n children
Assuming with Carlson and Pelletier (2002) that the deﬁnite article in DPs with ab-
stract average is vacuous (indicated in (41) by th’average; see Kennedy and Stanley
(2008) for a possible explanation of why this is so), composition in (41) gives us
(42a), which maps onto (42b) when we plug in the denotation for average in (35a),
and ultimately spells out as the truth conditions in (42c).
WHAT AN AVERAGE SEMANTICS NEEDS 477(42) a. [[[A average]]]([[American]])([[ n x.x has n children]])([[2.3]])
b. average([[ n x.x has n children]])([[American]])([[2.3]])
c.  y American  z.max{n | z has n children}(y)
|American |
= 2.3
Note that this derivation assumes a non-quantiﬁcational type d for the number. If
we want to assume that numbers undergo QR only if they are assigned a quantiﬁ-
cational type, then the derivation would be one in which 2.3 has the type  dt,t 
denotation  D d,t .D( . ) and takes the rest of the sentence (which is type  d,t 
after composition) as its argument.
Constructions with adverbial on average, such as (33b), are analyzed in
exactly the same way. Assuming that on average attaches to VP (it can be preposed
and included in VP-ellipsis), we can analyze its meaning as in (43) and posit the LF
in (44) for (33b). (Alternatively, if numbers are type  dt,t  when they raise, then
on average should be assigned a denotation in which the domain comes second and
the average term comes third, and 2.3 should take scope above the subject.)
(43) [[PP on average]]] =   f d S.average(f)(S)(d)
(44)
Americans
2.3
 n
have
n children
on average
(45) shows the derivation of the truth conditions of this LF; once again, we end up
with a meaning that is equivalent to what we get in the other average constructions.
(45) a. [[[PP on average]]]( n x.x has n children)(2.3)([[Americans]])
b. average( n x.x has n children)([[Americans]])(2.3)
c.  y Americans  z.max{n | z has n children}(y)
|Americans |
= 2.3
We have thus accounted for our two most difﬁcult cases — the average NP
and on average — without positing any special interpretive mechanisms beyond
those that are independently necessary to account for other constructions. The cru-
cial ﬁnal piece of the analysis is the assumption that natural language allows for
the possibility that some expressions can take another expression’s nuclear scope
as an argument: in Barker’s terms, they may be “parasitic” on the scope of another
term. The literature on comparatives, plurals and same/different that we have cited
indicates that such an option must be available to the interpretive system; average
can be viewed as further evidence for this conclusion.
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developed in Heim and Kratzer (1998), in which scope relations are encoded in
a syntactic representation of Logical Form. However, however, our proposals are
consistent with “directly compositional” alternatives that reproduce syntactic scope
through type- and category-shifting rules. In fact, when we take a closer look at
how parasitic scope is implemented in different frameworks, we see that average
sentences may actually provide an argument in favor of preferring one of these
alternative theories of the syntax-semantics interface over an LF-based approach.
To see why let us consider how parasitic scope LFs like (41) and (44) can
actually be derived. At ﬁrst glance, it appears that such representations are a con-
sequence of the grammar of quantiﬁer raising. As pointed out by Sauerland (1998)
(see also Bhatt and Takahashi (2007)), given Heim and Kratzer’s (1998) formula-
tion of QR, which results in the “index-adjunction” structures that we have repre-
sented using as adjoined  s, parasitic scope representations can be derived by two
instances of QR, such that the second targets the position just below the ﬁrst. This
is illustrated in (46).
(46)
A
 i
... ti ... B ...
= 
A
B
  j
 i
... ti ... tj ...
A feature of this approach to parasitic scope is that it necessarily involves
two instances of QR: the ﬁrst creates the scope term that the second is parasitic on.
In the case of the average NP sentences, this is not a problem: let the number cor-
respond to the A term in (46) and let the average NP correspond to the B term. It
is not so clear how to derive the right LFs for on average, however, if (as generally
assumed) adverbs have ﬁxed positions in the syntax. In order to generate a repre-
sentation with the structural relations shown in (44), we would need to ﬁrst raise
the number, then insert the adverb. But this creates an ordering paradox: if QR is
part of the covert (post-spellout) part of the derivation, then the fact that the adverb
is pronounced means that it must be inserted after the number is raised.
Fortunately, there are other ways to derive parasitic scope that do not run
into this problem. One option would be to allow for numbers and other terms to
appear in scope positions at a level of Logical Form, but to set up the system so
that every constituent between the scope-taking term and its base trace is a function
over the denotation of the trace. The simplest way of implementing this would be
to adopt Jacobson’s (1999) variable-free analysis of bound pronouns, and traces as
identity functions. In this approach, the principle in (47) (the “Geach rule”) has the
effect of binding off an unsaturated argument at each higher node.
(47) a. SYNTAX: gcat(B/A)=Bcat/Acat
b. SEMANTICS: If f is a function of type  a,b  then gc(f) is a function
of type   c,a , c,b  , where gc(f)= h i.f(h(i))
WHAT AN AVERAGE SEMANTICS NEEDS 479Normally, (47) applies successively, so that an argument position occupied by a pro-
noun remains unsaturated, until a special “binding” rule z kicks in. However, noth-
ing rules out the possibility that certain terms are actually looking for a Geached
constituent as a matter of lexical category/meaning; such terms would be parasitic
on the scope of another term in exactly the sense we need. Assigning the lexi-
cal entry in (48) to on average, for example, makes it parasitic on the scope of a
number:
(48)
 
 
 
on average
CAT (NumP\(DP\S))/(DP\S)NumP
SEM   f d,et  d S.average(f)(S)(d)
 
 
 
This approach clearly needs closer scrutiny, in particular for problems of overgen-
eration. However, the fact that the status of a particular expression as a “scope
parasite” is a matter of lexical speciﬁcation may provide a means of appropriately
restricting the range of constructions in which parasitic scope applies.
Alternatively, we could simply adopt the analysis of parasitic scope devel-
oped by Barker (2007), which straightforwardly handles the examples under con-
siderationhere. Thewholetheorycanbeboileddowntoasinglestructuralpostulate
(“ ” in section 7 of Barker’s paper), which can be added to an off-the-shelf type
logical grammar and forms the basis of Barker’s more general continuation-based
theory of scope. We confess to not yet have full enough command of the details of
the theory to explore all its predictions, but the fact that it derives parasitic scope
as a by product of a more general theory of quantiﬁcation (and is directly composi-
tional), is certainly a signiﬁcant point in its favor.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a semantics of average sentences according to
which (morphosyntactically) deﬁnite noun phrases of the form the average NP are
semantically not referring expressions, but rather what we might call “averaging
expressions”. As such, they do not involve reference to bizarre individuals, and
as we have seen, they do not involve predication of impossible properties (like the
property of having 2.3 children) of any individuals. Crucially, our analysis is fully
compositional, and has an empirical advantage over all previous analyses in extend-
ing beyond the adjectival and adverbial forms of average and explaining how the
various other ways of expressing averages illustrated in (6) give rise to the same
core truth conditions. Finally, our account of the interpretation of the average NP
and its adverbial cousin on average provides new evidence that the grammar must
include principles that allow for the possibility of parasitic scope.
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